America and Empire: Thoughts on a Debate by Cooley, Alexander A.
America and Empire: Thoughts on a Debate 
by Alex Cooley 
In a recent issue of Foreign Affairs, Alex Motyl posed the question, “Do past empires 
hold lessons for U.S. foreign policy today?” In a review of two new books (an edited 
volume by Craig Calhoun and a study by Charles Maier), he concluded that "efforts [to 
show that they do] yield little payoff." 
To be sure, the use of the term “empire” has become commonplace in descriptions of 
contemporary U.S. foreign policy. Yet, save for a small group of exceptions, American 
political scientists until now have mostly neglected the theoretical investigation of 
empires and the dynamics of imperial relations. Filling a massive gap in the literature, 
political scientists Dan Nexon and Thomas Wright’s new article “What’s at Stake in the 
American Empire Debate” published in the May 2007 American Political Science Review 
is one of the most thought-provoking and policy relevant scholarly articles to appear in 
recent years in the field. The article builds on much of Nexon’s previous work on the 
network properties of early-modern empires, but applies these insights to some of the 
central problems confronting today’s U.S. foreign policy community. 
Central to Nexon and Wright’s analysis is the contention that the term “empire” has been 
stripped of much of its analytical content and, instead, is now used (and over-used) to 
describe the aggressive or domineering foreign policy actions of the United States. 
Accordingly, the terms “empire” and “imperial” have become fused with normative 
connotations about unchecked expansionism. Consequently, policymakers disdain the 
term’s implications, while they ignore coming to terms with the actual political logics and 
trade-offs produced by an imperial political order. Former Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld’s now infamous quote that “we don’t do empire” comes to mind, although 
some now would add the word “well” to the end of that particular musing. 
In a theoretical tour-de-force, the Nexon and Wright suspend the current normative use of 
the term in order to explore the actual structural or network characteristics of imperial 
systems. In doing so, they upend many of the assumptions of the international relations 
discipline. 
The authors propose that two structural properties distinguish imperial systems from 
other types of hierarchical political orders such as unipolar systems or hegemonic orders. 
First, empires are systems where a central power exercises control over peripheral 
polities indirectly through intermediaries or “informal” rule. Second, these imperial 
arrangements or contracts differ across a central power’s different peripheries. So the 
terms of governance of imperial rule over “Periphery A” are not the same as those over 
peripheries B or C. In this way, the authors distinguish imperial rule from a federal 
arrangement under which all contracts with subordinate units are equal. In turn, the 
various peripheries of an imperial system remain segmented or walled off from one 
another as their relations are mediated and managed by the core power. In visual terms, 
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imperial systems resemble a rimless hub and spokes of a wheel, rimless because the 
individual peripheries at the end of each spoke remain segmented. 
 
   
This simple network analytic has three major consequences for how international 
relations theorists should think about systemic dynamics. First, traditional balance-of-
power concerns, the supposedly timeless practice of states playing power politics against 
each other, are supplanted by divide-and-rule dynamics. That is, empires seek to control, 
manage and extract resources from their peripheries, but must also prevent the formation 
of collective ties among peripheries that might become the basis for future anti-imperial 
collective action. 
Second, the axis of relevant political relations shifts from interstate relations to 
intersocietal within peripheries, as imperial centers empower intermediaries to govern 
local populations according to specific markers of social status and hierarchy. From the 
center’s perspective, there is a trade-off between controlling the actions of an 
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intermediary (or the “principal-agent” problem), while allowing them to retain local 
legitimacy as a ruler. 
Third, empires face perennial problems of legitimating their control, especially when they 
try to maintain authority across a wide audience of multiple peripheries that have very 
different demands and expectations from the center. Thus, a justification of rule to one 
periphery may completely contradict the rationale given to another. Accordingly, 
imperial centers must be mindful of their mixed messages or, more precisely, the 
structural capacity for peripheries to realize they are receiving mixed messages. As the 
authors observe, “Multivocal signaling is most effective when the two audiences either 
cannot or do not communicate with one another. (p. 264).” All of these theoretical claims 
are illustrated with loads of fascinating anecdotes drawn from such seemingly disparate 
empires as the British East India Company, the Mongols, the Hapsburgs and the Soviet 
Union. 
The “real world” implications of all of this rigorous theorizing are too numerous to 
summarize, but let me flag four important issues that the Nexon and Wright model raises. 
First, this account of international relations provides a more robust account of Cold War 
politics than traditional balance-of-power accounts that focus just on the inter-state 
bipolar competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Nexon and 
Wright model explains both great power competition and why the United States and 
Soviet Union took such pains to intervene in the internal affairs of peripheral countries 
and reinforce the client status of allies (the Shah in Iran, Marcos in the Philippines, Park 
in South Korea) by providing them with private goods. Cold War politics exhibited both 
balance-of-power and divide and rule dynamics, even though the legitimating strategy of 
the latter was one of systemic anti-Communism. 
Second, in terms of the Nexon/Wright model, America’s actual resort to imperial 
governance since the end of the Cold War has been declining, not increasing. Of course, 
the post 9/11 military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq have drawn more attention to 
the practice of “American Empire” and the authors acknowledge that “empire”-like 
qualities of continuing U.S. intervention in these countries. But the more counterintuitive 
point is that America’s use of overtly imperial systems is actually not as widespread as it 
was during the 1960s and 1970s. 
One major reason for this decline is that globalization – contra the claims of many 
globalization critics – undermines the conditions necessary for effective imperial 
management by the center. Today, imperial powers can no longer monopolize globalizing 
processes such as transnational information flows, media broadcasts, NGO activity and 
economic exchange. Such transnational flows undercut the informational firewalls that 
imperial managers have traditionally erected between their peripheries to maintain 
segmentation and prevent collective action. For example, Al Jazeera and other Middle 
Eastern cable news networks can instantly and effectively undermine U.S. legitimation 
strategies regarding its Middle East policy by broadcasting daily images of how America 
and its political clients routinely disregard human rights concerns and democratic ideals. 
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The contradictions of multivocal legitimation strategies are more quickly, and effectively, 
exposed in our global era. 
The U.S. experience with Uzbekistan is a good case in point. To support its military 
campaign in Afghanistan, the United States established a military base in southern 
Uzbekistan in fall 2001 and signed a security cooperation agreement with the Uzbek 
government. Under its terms, the United States aided and armed Uzbek security services 
in exchange for basing rights. However, it turned out that the Uzbek government had 
little interest in adhering to its human rights obligations and used its international support 
as a partner in the war on terror to eradicate all forms of domestic opposition, not just 
Islamists with ties to al-Qaeda. 
The most egregious of these actions was the so-called Andijan massacre in May 2005 
when troops that were dispatched by the Uzbek Ministry of the Interior killed hundreds of 
demonstrators in the eastern city of Andijan. Following these events, the cross-periphery 
dissonance between the justifications for promoting democratic state-building in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and supporting the heavy-handed actions of the Uzbek regime became an 
international embarrassment to U.S policymakers. Even William Kristol, editor of the 
hawkish neo-conservative Weekly Standard, pointed out that the administration’s Uzbek 
policy simply was no longer compatible with the public logic of America’s involvement 
in the Middle East or its support of the colored revolutions in the other former Soviet 
states. In the end, the United States military was shortly after evicted from its military 
base, as the Uzbek government grew increasingly concerned that U.S. officials were 
actually intent on fomenting democratic change. Multivocal signaling, in the Uzbek case, 
delegitimized U.S. relations with the Middle East, but it also lessened American 
credibility with the Uzbek government. 
Again, the analytical point here is not that the United States is hypocritical in the conduct 
of its external relations; rather, it is that traditional “multivocal” appeals and legitimating 
strategies can no longer function effectively in a global setting where contradictory 
justifications cannot be restricted to specific peripheries and political clients. 
Third, Nexon and Wright correctly focus our attention on the formal structures of 
hierarchy operating in the contemporary international system. But we should be aware 
that states and international actors often employ a mixture of different types of 
hierarchical organizational forms, some of which require intermediaries and others which 
are more direct. Thus, Iraqi reconstruction has been delegated to intermediary private 
corporations and contractors, most of them American, however the U.S. military 
continues to directly play the major security function within the country. Moreover, some 
states may also find themselves at the periphery of multiple “imperial centers” and their 
dictates. The former Communist countries of East Europe may be a case in point, as they 
implement both the conditions and expectations laid out by the EU while they integrate 
themselves into the security network of the United States (including its overseas basing 
network and/or global missile defense shield). 
 5
The fourth – and most unsavory – implication of the Nexon/Wright model concerns what 
an “effective” U.S. strategy would look like in Iraq. The authors convincingly point to 
some of the control problems that using unreliable intermediaries in Iraq has generated 
for the United States. But their own analytic scheme points to the broader problem 
inherent in current U.S. efforts to preserve Iraqi unity while maintaining a political 
balance among Iraq’s factions in a quasi-democratic setting. 
In fact, the extreme implication of the Nexon/Wright model for U.S. policymakers would 
be to more vigorously pursue “divide-and-rule” policies in Iraq instead of its 
contradictory nation-building policies of “unite and rule.” This would mean, practically, 
to empower or even openly arm Shiite and Kurdish factions against the Sunni minority 
and to license such action in exchange for American patronage. Now, to be clear, the 
authors do not advocate such a policy (and nor do I), but some others have, drawing upon 
this structural imperial logic. 
All of this points to the fact that U.S. officials have not learned basic lessons from past 
imperial experiences. Indeed, the very explosion in the recent use of the term “empire” by 
critics of U.S. foreign policy merely highlights the failure of the U.S. to adequately 
manage its imperial cross-pressures and multivocal contradictions. Moreover, from this 
perspective, the rapid erosion of American legitimacy throughout the world – as 
evidenced in surveys like the Pew Survey on Global Attitudes – should be a much more 
central concern for the current managers of the American Empire than it was for its 
discredited recent champions. 
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